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Australian Ministry of Law Enforcement:
What are your biggest cybersecurity concerns for 
emerging technology and autonomous systems? 
What interesting insight have you gained from your 
trip to Silicon Valley? 
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UAS Cybersecurity Challenges
• Rapidly evolving systems and market
• Evolution towards cyber-physical systems within system-of-systems
• Continual emergence of new threats, vulnerabilities, and attack vectors.
• Lack of formal methods and standardization for cybersecurity
• Approaches
• Best practices, using a combination of techniques 
• Analysis
• Experience
• Enumeration
• Intuition
• Constant vigilance
• Build cybersecurity into the methods, procedures, and oversight roles 
throughout an organization
• Compliance requirements and accountability
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DoD Comprehensive Threat Model for Smart-Device 
Controlled UAS  (Mansfield 2015)
• High-level top-down analysis of smart-device controlled UAS
• Threat model analyzed three categories
1. Hardware
2. Software
• Operating System
• Software Applications
3. Communication Networks
4. People and Processes
• Approach for each category
• Describe attack motivation
• List threats
• Describe attack methods/vectors
• Suggest mitigations
• Limitations and Gaps
• High-level, general, non-specific
• Relies on top-down enumeration
• Does not address malicious manufacturers/
providers or malicious GCS software developers
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sUAS Cybersecurity Threat Model Analysis (Javaid, 2002)
• Define the system
• Develop network and architecture 
models for analyis
• Enumerate and categorize threats 
(top-down and bottom-up)
• Perform risk assessment of each 
threat
• Take action based on severity of 
risks
• Track, Mitigate, Redesign
• Continually reevaluate the threat 
model
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Updating Threat Model Analysis
• Cybersecurity models must be constantly updated and reviewed
• Particularly for changes/revisions or when new cybersecurity concerns are 
identified
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1.1 Vehicle Airframe
(Mechanical Components Only) 1.3 Onboard Avionics
1.0 Flight Vehicle 
System (FVS)
1.2 Motor and Controller 
Assembly (new CPU+I2C)
No New Cybersecurity Concern
New Cybersecurity Concern
Systems are getting more complex…
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See https://utm.arc.nasa.gov/ for more details.
How will we secure the future 
of unmanned aviation? 
